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1. Introduction  
 
In many control applications, networks are being used as a transmission medium for control 
data such as sensor readings, controller signals, and alarm signals. The resulting control 
system is termed a Networked Control system (NCS) (Clauset et al., 2008; Hespanha et al., 
2007; Yang, 2006). Examples of NCS application areas include industrial automation, 
building automation, home automation, intelligent vehicle systems, and advanced aircraft 
and spacecraft. Compared to point-to-point wiring, this approach simplifies wiring in 
complex systems where several subsystems are interconnected and where sensors and 
actuators may be physically remote from the controller.  System hence becomes easier to 
control and maintain.  Networks also enable communication between several control loops 
and fault-tolerance through redundancy of components. This chapter summarizes work 
done by the authors in the area of performance and reliability of networked control systems. 
Communication networks were first introduced in digital control systems in the 1970’s. 
Since then, several types of communication networks have been developed to serve this 
field. Protocols for these networks can be grouped into fieldbuses (e.g. FIP and PROFIBUS), 
automotive buses (e.g. CAN), other machine buses (e.g. 1553B and the IEC train communication 
network), general-purpose networks (e.g. IEEE LAN’s and ATM-LAN) and a number of 
research protocols (e.g. TTP). 
In manufacturing applications, the network connecting controllers with sensors and 
actuators typically constitutes one level in a hierarchy of networks.  Fig. 1 illustrates a 
general network hierarchy model (Lian et al., 2001b). This model consists of five levels, each 
one having different goals and also different communication capabilities, protocols and 
complexity. Level one is the device or sensor-actuator level that is used to interconnect 
controllers, sensors or actuators. Level two is the cell control level and it is designed to be 
used with cell controllers such as at milling, lathe and control workstations in 
manufacturing plants. Generally, levels one and two are called sensor and fieldbus, 
respectively. Level three is the supervisory level and is used to interconnect machine cells 
that perform different manufacturing processes. Level four is the plant management level 
and is used to coordinate various tasks executed inside a plant such as manufacturing 
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engineering, production management, and resource allocation. Level five is the corporate 
management level.  It may interconnect workstations located in different cities or countries 
(Lian et al., 2001b). 
 Fig. 1. A general network hierarchy model (Lian et al., 2001b) 
 
A wide variety of network protocols can be used to build an NCS, each suitable for a 
particular application sector (Thomesse, 2005).  However, the use of Ethernet remains a 
viable and interesting option (Decotignie, 2005).   Ethernet is now the dominant local area 
networking solution in the home and office environments. It is fast, economic and easy to 
install. Many computerized equipments now come with built-in Ethernet Interfaces. These 
are some of the reasons why a number of manufacturers of industrial control systems are 
now migrating to the use of Ethernet on the production floor and integrate it with the 
management floor (Decotignie, 2005). 
A highly desirable requirement is for the office Ethernet communication capability to be 
fully retained when applying it for control, i.e., the best solution would be if no protocol 
change were introduced (Daoud et al., 2003; Felser, 2005).  Capabilities of Ethernet networks 
allow us to envision the merger of several hierarchy levels in a single network.  A main 
focus of this research is thus to test the network operation and performance in the presence 
of mixed traffic. 
A major problem in networked control systems is the delays introduced by the network in 
the control loop. Further problems may be caused by possible loss of data packets.  Beyond 
certain limits, delays will result in poor system response and tend to destabilize the control 
loop.  Network delays are generally variable and depend on such factors as the used 
network protocol, network topology, and the amount of network traffic from other sources. 
In this chapter the focus is on both the performance and reliability aspects of Ethernet based 
NCS.  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a small survey on 
previous works done in the area of NCS using Ethernet as communication protocol. Section 
3 Introduces the network and its different components. Section 4 describes the model for 
simulation. Section 5 presents the network simulation results. Sections 6, 7 and 8 discuss the 
reliability and availability of fault-tolerant production lines. Section 9 concludes this 
research. 
 
2. Ethernet Networked Control Systems 
  
Abundant research results on the use of Ethernet as a communication network for NCS have 
been published in the recent years. Interested readers may refer to (Brahimi, 2007; 
Decotignie, 2005; Felser, 2005; Georges, 2005; Kumar, 2001; Lian et al., 2001a; Marsal, 2006a; 
Nilsson, 1998; Skeie et al., 2002).  
 Fig. 2. NCS Block Diagram (Nilsson, 1998) 
 
Automated workcells (Morris, 2005) always include sensors, controllers and actuators 
connected over the network.  The control packet flow on the Ethernet channel is based on 
publisher/subscriber mode of communication: once the packet is generated, it can be heard 
by any node on the network. This facilitates the data flow and eliminates the duplication of 
sensors. A comparison between different methods of communication is given in (Marsal, 
2006a). The model of Fig. 2 (Nilsson, 1998) shows a schematic of NCS. 
In this model, the physical data is sensed on a periodical basis (clock driven) every h 
seconds. It is transmitted from the sensor to the controller of the network facing a delay sck . 
It is consumed at the controller node and processed over ck  delay. The controller sends the 
control action over the network to reach the actuator after a delay cak . 
The source of non-determinism in switched Ethernet is queuing delays. For example, the 
controller node may generate non-real-time traffic (also known as explicit messaging, in 
contrast with implicit messaging used to designate the real-time control) like FTP sessions or 
HTTP. This will perturb the queues and the processing loads at the controller node. 
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loop.  Network delays are generally variable and depend on such factors as the used 
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NCS.  The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 presents a small survey on 
previous works done in the area of NCS using Ethernet as communication protocol. Section 
3 Introduces the network and its different components. Section 4 describes the model for 
simulation. Section 5 presents the network simulation results. Sections 6, 7 and 8 discuss the 
reliability and availability of fault-tolerant production lines. Section 9 concludes this 
research. 
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Automated workcells (Morris, 2005) always include sensors, controllers and actuators 
connected over the network.  The control packet flow on the Ethernet channel is based on 
publisher/subscriber mode of communication: once the packet is generated, it can be heard 
by any node on the network. This facilitates the data flow and eliminates the duplication of 
sensors. A comparison between different methods of communication is given in (Marsal, 
2006a). The model of Fig. 2 (Nilsson, 1998) shows a schematic of NCS. 
In this model, the physical data is sensed on a periodical basis (clock driven) every h 
seconds. It is transmitted from the sensor to the controller of the network facing a delay sck . 
It is consumed at the controller node and processed over ck  delay. The controller sends the 
control action over the network to reach the actuator after a delay cak . 
The source of non-determinism in switched Ethernet is queuing delays. For example, the 
controller node may generate non-real-time traffic (also known as explicit messaging, in 
contrast with implicit messaging used to designate the real-time control) like FTP sessions or 
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Accordingly, the end-to-end delays (the delay measured from the sensor node to the 
actuator node taking into consideration all kind of encapsulation/de-capsulation, 
processing and propagation delays) will not be constant. This is what is called mixed traffic 
environment. It is important to test the Ethernet NCS behavior in simple control 
environment (only control packets are communicated) and mixed traffic environment. 
Early works such as (Meditch & Lea, 1983) tried to modify the medium access sub-layer of 
CSMA/CD to distinguish between real-time and other traffic packets. Studies were 
conducted to test stability of the communication channel and to optimize its performance. 
Rockwell-Automation studied the use of Ethernet in its switched topology in control and 
they merged Ethernet with ControlNet to make what is called EtherNet/IP (Ethernet/IP; 
Lounsbury & Westerman, 2001; ODVA1; ODVA2; ControlNet). By using both TCP/IP and 
UDP/IP protocols to encapsulate networked messages, both real-time I/O and “explicit 
messaging” can occur. Also, by providing Ethernet users with real-time I/O, device-
configuration, and diagnostic capabilities, along with interoperability and 
interchangeability, EtherNet/IP provides an Ethernet standard for automation 
(Ethernet/IP). 
In (Walsh & Ye, 2001), a new dynamic scheduling technique for NCS is proposed. The 
network here is not only dedicated for control purposes, but it can also accommodate 
communication frames. This gives rise to network induced delays due to unpredictable 
loads. The control algorithm was made off-line ignoring network delays. This simplified the 
analysis tremendously. Including time delays is a new approach to validate their work. 
Also, the simplicity of this approach makes it attractive to be used in general studies for any 
NCS. The simplicity of the approach in (Walsh & Ye, 2001) comes from the fact that they are 
using a simple state space representation of the overall NCS. 
In (Marsal, 2006a), an analysis is made to define the source of delay in an Ethernet NCS; it 
shows that the overall response time is the sum of three delays: processing time, waiting 
time for synchronization of asynchronous processes and waiting time for availability of 
shared resources. A comparison between two methods to evaluate this response time 
(simulation and colored Petri nets) can be found in (Marsal et al., 2006b). In this research, the 
synchronization delays are included as well as the time for availability of shared resources 
in the processing delays of the nodes. Also, these two major time delays are the focus of 
other research works (Sundararaman et al., 2005). 
In this chapter, the focus is only on switched Ethernet at different speeds.  In (Skeie et al., 
2002), Fast Ethernet was tested to eliminate the various, usually incompatible, 
communication networks at the traditional substation automation. This study was 
conducted to test the possibility of using Fast Ethernet in the switched topology in power 
station control application. Results of this study were satisfactory within the time frame of 
the considered application. Because the application presented in (Skeie et al., 2002) had 
relatively large time frame limit, Fast Ethernet switch topology succeeded to run this 
system.  Later works showed that with more tight timing requirements, especially in mixed 
traffic environment, the speed of Gigabit Ethernet will be necessary for successful operation.  
 
3. Network Nodes 
  
The network nodes of a typical NCS model are namely: sensors, actuators and controllers. 
These are the active nodes that generate and consume traffic. Other nodes that are present to 
build the network are switches for a switched operation mode. The fabric of the network 
used in this research is mainly Ethernet at 100Mbps and 1Gbps speeds. This means that 
there are two types of networks that are tested in this study: Switched Fast Ethernet 
(100Mbps Ethernet) and Switched Gigabit Ethernet (1Gbps Ethernet). 
 
3.1 Sensor/actuator Networking Level 
At this level, networked devices consist essentially of smart sensors, networked controllers, 
and smart actuators. Smart sensors are nodes that have the capability of data acquisition, 
intelligence and communication. They acquire proper physical data such as temperature or 
speed from the industrial environment and have a network-capable application processor to 
interface with the network. Intelligence gives smart sensors the ability to function 
independently. Finally to be able to communicate over the network, the sensor must be able 
to properly encode the information before sending it out on the network. 
Smart actuators have the features of actuation, intelligence and communication. They are 
able to decode the information from the network medium and apply it to the physical 
devices (Lian et al., 2001b). 
Networked controllers have the major function of analyzing the sensor data, making 
decisions, and giving commands to actuators. The control algorithm should handle 
decentralized information analysis as well as traditional centralized analysis. Networked 
controller nodes may also provide a human-machine interface to operators or higher-level 
managers. 
Candidate networks protocols at this level must meet two main criteria: bounded time delay 
and guaranteed transmission. Unsuccessfully transmitted or large time-delay messages may 
deteriorate system performance. The system can even become unstable.  Several protocols 
have been proposed to meet these requirements for control systems (Nilsson, 1998). The 
performance requirements mentioned above are used to determine the capability of the 
network medium and to provide design specifications to control parameters such as 
sampling rates as well as network parameters such as communication rates. 
  
3.2 Using Ethernet in the Sensor/Actuator Level 
With the use of Ethernet at this level, many things that were not possible in past 
implementations of NCS will be enabled. Once the industrial floor (the machines network 
connection) is running on top of Ethernet, it can be interconnected with the management 
floor (engineering and management network connections). This will help in problem 
diagnostic and set-up. Now more and more functions can be added. One possibility is on-
line system diagnostics and fix-up, by logging into the machine while running in normal 
operation and setting-up some parameters without the need to stop the operation. This 
means integration of communication packets (log-on, request/download file, up-load file, 
log-off) while performing the usual control tasks (traffic of real-time control packets). 
Moreover, some tasks that can be performed by the operator can be enabled like web-
browsing and e-mail check. These tasks add to the communication load that the network 
handles as an overhead to the pure control load that it is built to support. 
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performance requirements mentioned above are used to determine the capability of the 
network medium and to provide design specifications to control parameters such as 
sampling rates as well as network parameters such as communication rates. 
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With the use of Ethernet at this level, many things that were not possible in past 
implementations of NCS will be enabled. Once the industrial floor (the machines network 
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diagnostic and set-up. Now more and more functions can be added. One possibility is on-
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log-off) while performing the usual control tasks (traffic of real-time control packets). 
Moreover, some tasks that can be performed by the operator can be enabled like web-
browsing and e-mail check. These tasks add to the communication load that the network 
handles as an overhead to the pure control load that it is built to support. 
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3.3 Performance Metric 
The performance metrics of network systems that impact control system requirements 
include: access delay, transmission time, response time, message delay, message collisions 
(percentage of collision), message throughput (percentage of packets discarded), network 
utilization, and determinism boundaries. For control systems, candidate control networks 
generally must meet two main criteria: bounded time delay and guaranteed transmission; 
i.e., a message should be transmitted successfully within a bounded time delay (Lian et al., 
2001b). Unsuccessfully transmitted or large time-delay messages from a sensor to an 
actuator may deteriorate system performance or make a system unstable. Several protocols 
have been proposed to meet these requirements for control systems (Nilsson, 1998). The 
performance metrics mentioned above are used to determine the capability of the network 
medium and to provide design specifications to control parameters such as sampling rates 
as well as network parameters such as communication rates (Daoud et al., 2004a). 
As in (Georges, 2005), the focus of this research is to use Ethernet IEEE802.3 Std without 
modifications. A previous study was made to use Ethernet in control by changing the frame 
structure for real time packets (Tolly, 1997). Another study was made to design a real-time 
controller to control traffic of the communication medium in case of real-time constraint 
(Lee & Cho, 2001). More research can be found in (Brahimi et al., 2006; Eker & Cervin, 1999; 
Georges et al., 2006; Jasperneite & Elsayed, 2004a; Lian et al., 2001a; Vatanski et al., 2006; 
Wang & Keshav, 1999; Wittenmark et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 2001). 
In this research, the system success or failure is evaluated based on measuring the delay 
faced by the sensor data traveling over the network to reach the controller, the processing 
delay at the controller node, the propagation delay from the controller to the actuator node 
faced by the control packet, and finally the processing delay at the actuator node before 
applying the control word to the physical process. This end-to-end delay takes into 
consideration all kind of data encapsulation, propagation, de-capsulation and processing in 
all nodes on the network. End-to-end delay for Ethernet NCS can also be analyzed with 
network calculus as in (Georges, 2005; Grieu, 2004). The network delay can be expressed as: 
 
actuatorcontroller TTT DDD   (1) 
 
where TD  is the total end-to-end delay. 
 
controllercontrollercontrollersensorsensorsensorcontroler decapqpencappsT TTTTTD    (2) 
actuatoractuatoractuatorcontrollercontrollercontrolleractuator decapqpencappsT TTTTTD    (3) 
 
Where psT  is the processing delay 
 encapT  is the encapsulation delay 
 pT  is the propagation delay 
 qT  is the queuing delay 
 decapT  is the de-capsulation delay 
 
4. Models Description 
  
Many control applications naturally run at very low speeds compared to the speeds of the 
new network standards. This may imply that the required delays of control packets can be 
met under realistic loading conditions without handling these packets in a special manner. 
Individual machines can be transformed into automated workcells (Soloman, 1994). 
Networked Control Systems (NCS) make it possible to transform machines into small 
networks (machine LANs) (Daoud et al., 2003). All sensors are sources of traffic. All 
actuators are sinks of traffic. Data produced at sensor nodes is sent over the machine 
network to reach the controller node. At the controller, control information is computed and 
sent once again over the network to reach the corresponding actuator node. At the actuator, 
control action is applied on the physical system (the plant). 
Sensors and actuators in this scheme are smart. Smart sensors as well as smart actuators 
have the capability of data encapsulation/de-capsulation. They have network capability to 
be able to communicate over the machine network. Smart sensors are clock driven nodes: 
data is sampled at the sensor nodes at constant frequency. This frequency can vary from one 
sensor to the other depending on the physical quantity it is sensing (temperature is sampled 
at a lower sampling frequency than speed for example). Once the data is ready at the sensor 
node, it is encapsulated in network packet format and sent over the machine network. 
The controller node, which is an Industrial Personal Computer (IPC), is event driven. When 
it receives a packet form a sensor and after its de-capsulation and error check, it starts 
computing the necessary control action. Again, it encapsulates the control word and sends it 
in packet format to the actuator node. A smart actuator receives the control word and 
applies the appropriate control action to the system after de-capsulation and error check. 
Smart actuators are event driven as well (Daoud & Amer, 2007). 
Two main Models are presented in this work. The Stand Alone Machine Model and the In-
Line Production Model. 
 
4.1 Stand Alone Machine Model Description 
Stand Alone Machine Model tests the operation of a single machine (workcell) having all its 
connections based on Ethernet to implement the Ethernet NCS model. 
 
 Fig. 3. Stand alone machine model 
 
Two models were built for this study. One model is run on-top-of Fast Ethernet and the 
other one is run over Gigabit Ethernet for performance comparison. One model consists of 
16 sensors, one controller, and 4 actuators, based on the model of (Skeie et al., 2002). In the 
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Georges et al., 2006; Jasperneite & Elsayed, 2004a; Lian et al., 2001a; Vatanski et al., 2006; 
Wang & Keshav, 1999; Wittenmark et al., 1998; Zhang et al., 2001). 
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faced by the sensor data traveling over the network to reach the controller, the processing 
delay at the controller node, the propagation delay from the controller to the actuator node 
faced by the control packet, and finally the processing delay at the actuator node before 
applying the control word to the physical process. This end-to-end delay takes into 
consideration all kind of data encapsulation, propagation, de-capsulation and processing in 
all nodes on the network. End-to-end delay for Ethernet NCS can also be analyzed with 
network calculus as in (Georges, 2005; Grieu, 2004). The network delay can be expressed as: 
 
actuatorcontroller TTT DDD   (1) 
 
where TD  is the total end-to-end delay. 
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 encapT  is the encapsulation delay 
 pT  is the propagation delay 
 qT  is the queuing delay 
 decapT  is the de-capsulation delay 
 
4. Models Description 
  
Many control applications naturally run at very low speeds compared to the speeds of the 
new network standards. This may imply that the required delays of control packets can be 
met under realistic loading conditions without handling these packets in a special manner. 
Individual machines can be transformed into automated workcells (Soloman, 1994). 
Networked Control Systems (NCS) make it possible to transform machines into small 
networks (machine LANs) (Daoud et al., 2003). All sensors are sources of traffic. All 
actuators are sinks of traffic. Data produced at sensor nodes is sent over the machine 
network to reach the controller node. At the controller, control information is computed and 
sent once again over the network to reach the corresponding actuator node. At the actuator, 
control action is applied on the physical system (the plant). 
Sensors and actuators in this scheme are smart. Smart sensors as well as smart actuators 
have the capability of data encapsulation/de-capsulation. They have network capability to 
be able to communicate over the machine network. Smart sensors are clock driven nodes: 
data is sampled at the sensor nodes at constant frequency. This frequency can vary from one 
sensor to the other depending on the physical quantity it is sensing (temperature is sampled 
at a lower sampling frequency than speed for example). Once the data is ready at the sensor 
node, it is encapsulated in network packet format and sent over the machine network. 
The controller node, which is an Industrial Personal Computer (IPC), is event driven. When 
it receives a packet form a sensor and after its de-capsulation and error check, it starts 
computing the necessary control action. Again, it encapsulates the control word and sends it 
in packet format to the actuator node. A smart actuator receives the control word and 
applies the appropriate control action to the system after de-capsulation and error check. 
Smart actuators are event driven as well (Daoud & Amer, 2007). 
Two main Models are presented in this work. The Stand Alone Machine Model and the In-
Line Production Model. 
 
4.1 Stand Alone Machine Model Description 
Stand Alone Machine Model tests the operation of a single machine (workcell) having all its 
connections based on Ethernet to implement the Ethernet NCS model. 
 
 Fig. 3. Stand alone machine model 
 
Two models were built for this study. One model is run on-top-of Fast Ethernet and the 
other one is run over Gigabit Ethernet for performance comparison. One model consists of 
16 sensors, one controller, and 4 actuators, based on the model of (Skeie et al., 2002). In the 
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following, this model will be referred to as the light traffic system. The other model consists of 
48 sensors, one controller, and 4 actuators. This model will be referred to as the heavy traffic 
system. 
Sensors and actuators are smart. For traditional control using PLCs, 1 revolution per second 
is encoded into 1,440 electric pulses for electrical synchronization and control. This is why, 
the system presented in this study is operating at a sampling frequency of 1,440 Hz. 
Consequently, the system will have a deadline of 694 μs, i.e., a control action must be taken 
within a frame of 694 μs as round-trip delay originating from the sensor, passing through 
the controller, and transmitted once more over the network to reach the actuator. 
It should be noted that the heavy traffic case should be accompanied by an increase in the 
processing capabilities of the controller itself. Thus while in the light traffic case the 
controller was able to process 28,800 packets per second, this number was increased to 
74,880 in the heavy traffic case. (These numbers result from multiplying the number of 
sources and sinks by the sampling rate). The packet delay attributable to the controller will 
thus be reduced in the heavy traffic case. 
OPNET (Opnet) was used as a simulation platform. Real-time generating nodes (smart 
sensors and smart actuators) were modeled using the “advanced workstation” built-in 
OPNET model. This model allows the simulation of a node with complete adjustable 
parameters for operation. The node parameters were properly adjusted to meet the needed 
task as source of traffic (smart sensor) or sink of traffic (smart actuator). The Controller node 
was simulated also using “advanced workstation”. The Controller node is the administrator 
in this case: it receives all information from all smart sensors, calculate control parameters, 
and forward control words to dedicated smart actuators. Producer/ Customer model is 
finally used to send data from Controller node to smart actuators. 
All packets were treated in the switch in a similar manner, i.e., without prioritization. Thus, 
the packet format of the IEEE 803.2z standard (IEEE, 2000) was used without modification. 
Control signals in the simulations are assumed to be UDP packets. Also, the packet size was 
fixed to minimum frame size in Gigabit Ethernet (520 bytes). 
Simulations considered the effect of mixing the control traffic with other types of traffic. 
These include the option of on-line system diagnostic and fix-up (log-on, request/ 
download file, up-load file, log-off) as well as e-mail and web-browsing. FTP of 101KB files 
was considered (Skeie et al., 2002). HTTP, E-mail and telnet traffic was added using OPNET 
built-in heavy-load models (Daoud et al, 2003). 
 
4.2 In-Line Production Model Description 
In many cases, a final product is not produced only on one machine, but, it is handled by 
several machines in series or in-line. For this purpose, the In-Line Production Model is 
introduced and investigated. The idea is simply connecting all machine controllers together. 
Since each individual machine is Ethernet based, interconnecting their controllers (via 
Ethernet) will enable them to have access to the sensor/actuator level packet flow. 
The main function of the controller mounted on the machine is to take charge of machine 
control. An added task now is to help in synchronization. The controller has the major role 
of synchronizing several machines in line. This can also be done by connecting the networks 
of the two machines together. To perform synchronization, the controller of a machine sends 
its status vector to the controller another machine, and vice versa. Status vector means a 
complete knowledge of machine information, considering the cam position for example, the 
production rate, and so on. These pieces of information are very important for 
synchronization, especially the production rate. This is because, depending on this statistic, 
the machines can speed up or slow down to match their respective productions. 
A very important metric also, is the fact that the two controllers can back-up data on each 
other. This is a new added feature. This feature can achieve fault tolerance: in case of a 
controller failure, the other controller can take over and the machine is not out of service. 
Although this can slow down the production process, the production is not stopped (Daoud 
et al., 2004b). Hardware or software failure can cause the failure of one of the controllers. In 
that case, the information sent by the sensors to the OFF controller is consumed by another 
operating controller on another machine on the same network (Daoud et al., 2005). “OFF” 
controller is used instead of failed because the controller can be out of service for preventive 
maintenance for example. In other words, not only failure of a controller can be tolerated, 
but regular and preventive maintenance also; because in either cases, failure or maintenance, 
the controller is out of order. 
 
5. OPNET Network Simulations & Results 
 
First, network simulations have to be performed to validate the concept of Ethernet 
integration in its switched mode as a communication medium for NCS. OPNET is used to 
calculate system performance. 
 
5.1 Stand Alone Machine Models Simulation Results 
For the light traffic system, and integrating communication as well as control traffic, results 
for Fast Ethernet are found to be 671 μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, 
and 683 μs round-trip delay as peak value. Results for Gigabit Ethernet are found to be 501 
μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, and 517 μs round-trip delay as peak 
value. As the end-to-end delay limit is set to 694 μs (one sampling period), it can be seen that 
100Mbps Ethernet is just satisfying the delay requirements while 1Gbps Ethernet is excellent 
for such system (Daoud et al., 2003). 
For the heavy traffic system that consists of 48 smart sensors, 4 smart actuators and one 
controller, results for Fast Ethernet are found to be 622 μs round-trip delay in normal 
operating conditions, and 770 μs round-trip delay as peak value. Results for Gigabit 
Ethernet are found to be 450 μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, and 472 μs 
round-trip delay as peak value. The round-trip delay limit is still 694 μs (one sampling 
period). It can be seen that 100Mbps Ethernet exceeds the time limit while 1Gbps Ethernet is 
runs smoothly and can accommodate even more traffic (Daoud et al., 2003). 
All measured end-to-end delays include processing, propagation, queuing, encapsulation 
and de-capsulation delays according to equation 2 (Daoud, 2008). 
 
5.2 In-Line Production Light Traffic Models Simulation Results 
The first two simulations consist of two light-traffic machines working in-line with one 
machine having a failed controller. The failed controller traffic is switched to the operating 
controller node. One simulation uses Fast Ethernet while the other uses Gigabit Ethernet as 
communication medium. 
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following, this model will be referred to as the light traffic system. The other model consists of 
48 sensors, one controller, and 4 actuators. This model will be referred to as the heavy traffic 
system. 
Sensors and actuators are smart. For traditional control using PLCs, 1 revolution per second 
is encoded into 1,440 electric pulses for electrical synchronization and control. This is why, 
the system presented in this study is operating at a sampling frequency of 1,440 Hz. 
Consequently, the system will have a deadline of 694 μs, i.e., a control action must be taken 
within a frame of 694 μs as round-trip delay originating from the sensor, passing through 
the controller, and transmitted once more over the network to reach the actuator. 
It should be noted that the heavy traffic case should be accompanied by an increase in the 
processing capabilities of the controller itself. Thus while in the light traffic case the 
controller was able to process 28,800 packets per second, this number was increased to 
74,880 in the heavy traffic case. (These numbers result from multiplying the number of 
sources and sinks by the sampling rate). The packet delay attributable to the controller will 
thus be reduced in the heavy traffic case. 
OPNET (Opnet) was used as a simulation platform. Real-time generating nodes (smart 
sensors and smart actuators) were modeled using the “advanced workstation” built-in 
OPNET model. This model allows the simulation of a node with complete adjustable 
parameters for operation. The node parameters were properly adjusted to meet the needed 
task as source of traffic (smart sensor) or sink of traffic (smart actuator). The Controller node 
was simulated also using “advanced workstation”. The Controller node is the administrator 
in this case: it receives all information from all smart sensors, calculate control parameters, 
and forward control words to dedicated smart actuators. Producer/ Customer model is 
finally used to send data from Controller node to smart actuators. 
All packets were treated in the switch in a similar manner, i.e., without prioritization. Thus, 
the packet format of the IEEE 803.2z standard (IEEE, 2000) was used without modification. 
Control signals in the simulations are assumed to be UDP packets. Also, the packet size was 
fixed to minimum frame size in Gigabit Ethernet (520 bytes). 
Simulations considered the effect of mixing the control traffic with other types of traffic. 
These include the option of on-line system diagnostic and fix-up (log-on, request/ 
download file, up-load file, log-off) as well as e-mail and web-browsing. FTP of 101KB files 
was considered (Skeie et al., 2002). HTTP, E-mail and telnet traffic was added using OPNET 
built-in heavy-load models (Daoud et al, 2003). 
 
4.2 In-Line Production Model Description 
In many cases, a final product is not produced only on one machine, but, it is handled by 
several machines in series or in-line. For this purpose, the In-Line Production Model is 
introduced and investigated. The idea is simply connecting all machine controllers together. 
Since each individual machine is Ethernet based, interconnecting their controllers (via 
Ethernet) will enable them to have access to the sensor/actuator level packet flow. 
The main function of the controller mounted on the machine is to take charge of machine 
control. An added task now is to help in synchronization. The controller has the major role 
of synchronizing several machines in line. This can also be done by connecting the networks 
of the two machines together. To perform synchronization, the controller of a machine sends 
its status vector to the controller another machine, and vice versa. Status vector means a 
complete knowledge of machine information, considering the cam position for example, the 
production rate, and so on. These pieces of information are very important for 
synchronization, especially the production rate. This is because, depending on this statistic, 
the machines can speed up or slow down to match their respective productions. 
A very important metric also, is the fact that the two controllers can back-up data on each 
other. This is a new added feature. This feature can achieve fault tolerance: in case of a 
controller failure, the other controller can take over and the machine is not out of service. 
Although this can slow down the production process, the production is not stopped (Daoud 
et al., 2004b). Hardware or software failure can cause the failure of one of the controllers. In 
that case, the information sent by the sensors to the OFF controller is consumed by another 
operating controller on another machine on the same network (Daoud et al., 2005). “OFF” 
controller is used instead of failed because the controller can be out of service for preventive 
maintenance for example. In other words, not only failure of a controller can be tolerated, 
but regular and preventive maintenance also; because in either cases, failure or maintenance, 
the controller is out of order. 
 
5. OPNET Network Simulations & Results 
 
First, network simulations have to be performed to validate the concept of Ethernet 
integration in its switched mode as a communication medium for NCS. OPNET is used to 
calculate system performance. 
 
5.1 Stand Alone Machine Models Simulation Results 
For the light traffic system, and integrating communication as well as control traffic, results 
for Fast Ethernet are found to be 671 μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, 
and 683 μs round-trip delay as peak value. Results for Gigabit Ethernet are found to be 501 
μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, and 517 μs round-trip delay as peak 
value. As the end-to-end delay limit is set to 694 μs (one sampling period), it can be seen that 
100Mbps Ethernet is just satisfying the delay requirements while 1Gbps Ethernet is excellent 
for such system (Daoud et al., 2003). 
For the heavy traffic system that consists of 48 smart sensors, 4 smart actuators and one 
controller, results for Fast Ethernet are found to be 622 μs round-trip delay in normal 
operating conditions, and 770 μs round-trip delay as peak value. Results for Gigabit 
Ethernet are found to be 450 μs round-trip delay in normal operating conditions, and 472 μs 
round-trip delay as peak value. The round-trip delay limit is still 694 μs (one sampling 
period). It can be seen that 100Mbps Ethernet exceeds the time limit while 1Gbps Ethernet is 
runs smoothly and can accommodate even more traffic (Daoud et al., 2003). 
All measured end-to-end delays include processing, propagation, queuing, encapsulation 
and de-capsulation delays according to equation 2 (Daoud, 2008). 
 
5.2 In-Line Production Light Traffic Models Simulation Results 
The first two simulations consist of two light-traffic machines working in-line with one 
machine having a failed controller. The failed controller traffic is switched to the operating 
controller node. One simulation uses Fast Ethernet while the other uses Gigabit Ethernet as 
communication medium. 
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Other simulations investigate Gigabit Ethernet performance with more failed controllers on 
more machines in-line with only one functioning machine controller. In this case, the traffic 
of the failed controllers is deviated to the operational controller. Other simulations are run to 
test machine speed increase. As explained in the previous section, the nominal machine 
speed tested is 1 revolution per second (1,440Hz). 
Non-real-time traffic (as in (Daoud et al., 2003)) is added in the three simulations. This is to 
verify whether or not the system can still function and also if it can accommodate real and 
non-real-time traffic. 
Let the sensors/actuators of the machine with the operational controller be called near 
sensors/actuators. Also, let the sensors/actuators of the machine with the failed controller 
be called far sensors/actuators (Daoud, 2004a). 
Results for Fast Ethernet indicate that the delay is too high. The real-time delay a packet 
faces traveling from the near sensor to the controller and then to the near actuator is around 
732 sec. This is the sum of the delay the real-time packet faces traveling from sensor to 
controller and the delay it faces traveling from controller to actuator. For the far sensors and 
actuators, the delay is again too large: around 827 sec. 
Results for Gigabit Ethernet indicate that the delay is small: Only 521 sec round-trip delay 
for near nodes (see Fig. 4) and 538 sec round-trip delay for far nodes. 
For three machines with only one controller node operational and running on-top-of Gigabit 
Ethernet, a round-trip delay of approximately 567 sec was found for near nodes and 
approximately 578 sec round-trip delay for far nodes (Daoud et al., 2004b). 
When non-real-time traffic (of the same nature discussed in (Daoud et al., 2003)) is applied 
in order to jam the control traffic in all three scenarios, a considerable delay is measured. 
This delay is too large and causes a complete system failure because of the violation of the 
time constraint of one sampling period. Because of the 3 msec delay that appears in these 
circumstances with 2 OFF controllers and only 1 ON controller, explicit messaging must be 
prevented. Explicit messaging here refers to a mixture of non-real-time load of HTTP, FTP, 
e-mail check and telnet sessions. This is in contrast with “implicit messaging” of real-time 
control load.  
Machine 
Speed (rps) 
Maximum 
Permissible 
Delay (s) 
Number of 
Machines 
Number of 
OFF 
Controllers 
Maximum 
Measured 
Delay (s) 
1 694 1 0 501 
1 694 2 1 538 
1 694 3 2 578 
1 694 4 3 682 
1 694 5 4 0.266s 
1.2 579 3 2 536 
1.2 579 4 3 545 
1.3 534 2 1 509 
1.3 534 3 2 534 
1.3 534 4 3 545 
1.4 496 1 0 476 
1.4 496 2 1 501 
1.5 463 1 0 476 
Table 1. OPNET Simulation Results for In-Line Light Traffic Machine Model (Daoud et al., 
2005) 
This combination of non-real-time traffic loads simulates a real overhead jamming load 
introduced by the operator or chief engineer (specially FTP loads). This constraint is quiet 
acceptable in critical operation and preventing all kinds of non-real-time traffic is a 
justifiable sacrifice (Daoud et al., 2005). Final results are tabulated in Table 1. 
 
5.3 In-Line Production Heavy Traffic Models Simulation Results 
In this section, a simulation study of heavy traffic machines model consisting of 48 sensors, 1 
controller and 4 actuators working in-line, is conducted using OPNET. This NCS machine is 
simulated as switched Star Gigabit Ethernet LAN. Sensors are sources of traffic. The 
Controller is an intermediate intelligent node. Actuators are sinks of traffic. Having 52 real-
time packet generation and consumption nodes (48 sensors and 4 actuators) produces a 
traffic of 74,800 packet per second on the ether channel. This is because the system is 
running at a speed of 1 revolution per second (rps) to produce 60 strokes per minute 
(Bossar). Each revolution is encrypted into 1,440 electric pulses, which means that the 
sampling frequency is 1,440Hz (sampling period of 694s). The number of packets (74,800) is 
the multiplication of the number of nodes (52) by the sampling frequency (1,440) (Daoud et 
al., 2003). 
The most critical scenarios are studied. In these simulations, there is only one active 
controller while all other controllers on the same line are out of service. Studies for 2, 3 and 4 
in-line production machines are done. In all simulations, only one controller is functional 
and accommodates the control traffic of all 2, 3, or 4 machines on the production line. It was 
found that the system can tolerate the failure of a maximum of 2 failed controllers in a 3-
machine production line. In the case of a 4-machine production line with only one functional 
controller and 3 failed controllers, the deadline of 694s (1 sampling period) is violated 
(Daoud & Amer, 2007). 
Accordingly, it is again recommended to disable non-real-time loads during critical mode 
operation. In other control schemes that do not have the capabilities mentioned in this 
study, the production line is switched OFF as soon as one controller fails. 
 
Delay at actuator node Delay at controller node 
Fig. 4. OPNET Results for Two-Machine Production Line (Heavy Traffic) 
 
In all cases, end-to-end delays are measured. These delays includes all types of data 
encapsulation/de-capsulation on different network layers at all nodes. They also include 
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Other simulations investigate Gigabit Ethernet performance with more failed controllers on 
more machines in-line with only one functioning machine controller. In this case, the traffic 
of the failed controllers is deviated to the operational controller. Other simulations are run to 
test machine speed increase. As explained in the previous section, the nominal machine 
speed tested is 1 revolution per second (1,440Hz). 
Non-real-time traffic (as in (Daoud et al., 2003)) is added in the three simulations. This is to 
verify whether or not the system can still function and also if it can accommodate real and 
non-real-time traffic. 
Let the sensors/actuators of the machine with the operational controller be called near 
sensors/actuators. Also, let the sensors/actuators of the machine with the failed controller 
be called far sensors/actuators (Daoud, 2004a). 
Results for Fast Ethernet indicate that the delay is too high. The real-time delay a packet 
faces traveling from the near sensor to the controller and then to the near actuator is around 
732 sec. This is the sum of the delay the real-time packet faces traveling from sensor to 
controller and the delay it faces traveling from controller to actuator. For the far sensors and 
actuators, the delay is again too large: around 827 sec. 
Results for Gigabit Ethernet indicate that the delay is small: Only 521 sec round-trip delay 
for near nodes (see Fig. 4) and 538 sec round-trip delay for far nodes. 
For three machines with only one controller node operational and running on-top-of Gigabit 
Ethernet, a round-trip delay of approximately 567 sec was found for near nodes and 
approximately 578 sec round-trip delay for far nodes (Daoud et al., 2004b). 
When non-real-time traffic (of the same nature discussed in (Daoud et al., 2003)) is applied 
in order to jam the control traffic in all three scenarios, a considerable delay is measured. 
This delay is too large and causes a complete system failure because of the violation of the 
time constraint of one sampling period. Because of the 3 msec delay that appears in these 
circumstances with 2 OFF controllers and only 1 ON controller, explicit messaging must be 
prevented. Explicit messaging here refers to a mixture of non-real-time load of HTTP, FTP, 
e-mail check and telnet sessions. This is in contrast with “implicit messaging” of real-time 
control load.  
Machine 
Speed (rps) 
Maximum 
Permissible 
Delay (s) 
Number of 
Machines 
Number of 
OFF 
Controllers 
Maximum 
Measured 
Delay (s) 
1 694 1 0 501 
1 694 2 1 538 
1 694 3 2 578 
1 694 4 3 682 
1 694 5 4 0.266s 
1.2 579 3 2 536 
1.2 579 4 3 545 
1.3 534 2 1 509 
1.3 534 3 2 534 
1.3 534 4 3 545 
1.4 496 1 0 476 
1.4 496 2 1 501 
1.5 463 1 0 476 
Table 1. OPNET Simulation Results for In-Line Light Traffic Machine Model (Daoud et al., 
2005) 
This combination of non-real-time traffic loads simulates a real overhead jamming load 
introduced by the operator or chief engineer (specially FTP loads). This constraint is quiet 
acceptable in critical operation and preventing all kinds of non-real-time traffic is a 
justifiable sacrifice (Daoud et al., 2005). Final results are tabulated in Table 1. 
 
5.3 In-Line Production Heavy Traffic Models Simulation Results 
In this section, a simulation study of heavy traffic machines model consisting of 48 sensors, 1 
controller and 4 actuators working in-line, is conducted using OPNET. This NCS machine is 
simulated as switched Star Gigabit Ethernet LAN. Sensors are sources of traffic. The 
Controller is an intermediate intelligent node. Actuators are sinks of traffic. Having 52 real-
time packet generation and consumption nodes (48 sensors and 4 actuators) produces a 
traffic of 74,800 packet per second on the ether channel. This is because the system is 
running at a speed of 1 revolution per second (rps) to produce 60 strokes per minute 
(Bossar). Each revolution is encrypted into 1,440 electric pulses, which means that the 
sampling frequency is 1,440Hz (sampling period of 694s). The number of packets (74,800) is 
the multiplication of the number of nodes (52) by the sampling frequency (1,440) (Daoud et 
al., 2003). 
The most critical scenarios are studied. In these simulations, there is only one active 
controller while all other controllers on the same line are out of service. Studies for 2, 3 and 4 
in-line production machines are done. In all simulations, only one controller is functional 
and accommodates the control traffic of all 2, 3, or 4 machines on the production line. It was 
found that the system can tolerate the failure of a maximum of 2 failed controllers in a 3-
machine production line. In the case of a 4-machine production line with only one functional 
controller and 3 failed controllers, the deadline of 694s (1 sampling period) is violated 
(Daoud & Amer, 2007). 
Accordingly, it is again recommended to disable non-real-time loads during critical mode 
operation. In other control schemes that do not have the capabilities mentioned in this 
study, the production line is switched OFF as soon as one controller fails. 
 
Delay at actuator node Delay at controller node 
Fig. 4. OPNET Results for Two-Machine Production Line (Heavy Traffic) 
 
In all cases, end-to-end delays are measured. These delays includes all types of data 
encapsulation/de-capsulation on different network layers at all nodes. They also include 
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propagation delays on the communication network and the computational delay at the 
controller node. Results are tabulated in Table 2. Sample OPNET results are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Machine 
Speed 
(rps) 
Maximum 
Permissible 
Delay (s) 
Number 
of 
Machines 
Number of 
OFF 
Controllers 
Maximum 
Measured 
Delay (s) 
1 694 2 1 461 
1 694 3 2 522 
1 694 4 3 1ms 
1.1 631 2 1 497 
1.1 631 3 2 551 
1.2 579 2 1 464 
1.2 579 3 2 473 
1.3 534 2 1 483 
1.3 534 3 2 520 
1.4 496 2 1 476 
1.4 496 3 2 553 
1.5 463 2 1 464 
Table 2. OPNET Simulation Results for In-Line Heavy Traffic Machine Model (Daoud & 
Amer, 2007) 
  
6. Production Line Reliability 
 
In the previous sections, fault-tolerant production lines were described and studied from a 
communications/control point of view. It was shown, using OPNET simulations, that a 
production line with several machines working in-line, can work in a degraded mode. Upon 
the failure of a controller on one of the machines, the tasks of the failed controller are 
executed by another controller on another machine. This reduces the production line’s down 
time. This section shows how to estimate the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and how to use 
it to find the most cost-effective way of increasing production line reliability. 
Consider the following production line; it consists of two machines working in-line. Each 
machine has a controller, smart sensors and smart actuators. The sampling frequency of 
each machine is 1,440 Hz.. The machine will fail if the information delay from sensor to 
controller to actuator exceeds 694 µsec. Also, if one of the two machines fails, the entire 
production line fails. 
In (Daoud et al., 2004b), fault-tolerance was introduced on a system consisting of two such 
machines. Both machines were linked through Gigabit Ethernet. The Gigabit Ethernet 
network connected all sensors, actuators and both controllers. It was shown that the failure 
of one controller on either of the two machines could be tolerated. Special software detected 
the failure of the controller and transferred its tasks to the remaining functional controller. 
Non-real-time traffic of FTP, HTTP, telnet and e-mail was not permitted. Mathematical tools 
are needed to justify this extra cost and prove that production line reliability will increase. 
One such tool is Markov chains. This will be explained next. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Markov Model and Mean Time To Failure 
Continuous-time Markov models have been widely used to predict the reliability and/or 
availability of fault-tolerant systems (Billinton & Allan, 1983; Blanke et al., 2006; Johnson, 
1989, Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998; Trivedi, 2002). The Markov model describing the system 
being studied, is shown in Fig. 5. This same model is also found in (Arnold, 1973; Trivedi, 
2002). State START is the starting state and represents the error-free situation. If one of the 
two controllers fails, the system moves from state START to state ONE-FAIL. In this state, 
both machines are still operating but only one controller is communicating with all sensors 
and actuators on both machines. If this controller fails before the first one is repaired, the 
system moves from state ONE-FAIL to state LINE-FAIL. This state is the failure state. The 
transition rates for the Markov chain in Fig. 5 are explained next. 
 Fig. 5. Markov model 
 
The system will move from state START to state ONE-FAIL when one of the two controllers 
fails, assuming that the controller failure is detected and that the recovery software 
successfully transfers control of both machines to the remaining operational controller. 
Otherwise, the system moves directly from  state  START  to state LINE-FAIL. This  explains  
the  transition  from state START to state LINE-FAIL. Let c be the probability of successful 
detection and recovery. In the literature, the parameter c is known as the coverage and has to 
be taken into account in the Markov model. One of the earliest papers that defined the 
coverage is (Arnold, 1973). It defined the coverage as the proportion of faults from which a 
system automatically recovers. In (Trivedi, 2002), it was shown that a small change in the 
value of the coverage parameter had a big effect on system Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). 
The importance of the coverage was further emphasized in (Amer & McCluskey, 1986, 
1987a, 1987b, 1987c). Here, the controller software is responsible for detecting a controller 
failure and switching the control of that machine to the operational controller on the other 
machine. Consequently, the value of the coverage depends on the quality of the switching 
software on each controller. 
Assuming, for simplicity, that both controllers have the same failure rate λ, the transition 
rate from state START to state ONE-FAIL will be equal to A=2cλ. 
As mentioned above, the system will move from state START to state ONE-FAIL if a 
controller failure is not detected or if the recovery software does not transfer control to the 
operational controller. A software problem in one of the controllers, for example, can cause 
sensor data to be incorrectly processed and the packet sent to the actuator will have 
incorrect data but correct CRC. The actuator verifies the CRC, processes the data and the 
system fails. Another potential problem that cannot be remedied by the fault-tolerant 
architecture described here is as follows: Both controllers are operational but their inter-
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propagation delays on the communication network and the computational delay at the 
controller node. Results are tabulated in Table 2. Sample OPNET results are shown in Fig. 4. 
 
Machine 
Speed 
(rps) 
Maximum 
Permissible 
Delay (s) 
Number 
of 
Machines 
Number of 
OFF 
Controllers 
Maximum 
Measured 
Delay (s) 
1 694 2 1 461 
1 694 3 2 522 
1 694 4 3 1ms 
1.1 631 2 1 497 
1.1 631 3 2 551 
1.2 579 2 1 464 
1.2 579 3 2 473 
1.3 534 2 1 483 
1.3 534 3 2 520 
1.4 496 2 1 476 
1.4 496 3 2 553 
1.5 463 2 1 464 
Table 2. OPNET Simulation Results for In-Line Heavy Traffic Machine Model (Daoud & 
Amer, 2007) 
  
6. Production Line Reliability 
 
In the previous sections, fault-tolerant production lines were described and studied from a 
communications/control point of view. It was shown, using OPNET simulations, that a 
production line with several machines working in-line, can work in a degraded mode. Upon 
the failure of a controller on one of the machines, the tasks of the failed controller are 
executed by another controller on another machine. This reduces the production line’s down 
time. This section shows how to estimate the Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) and how to use 
it to find the most cost-effective way of increasing production line reliability. 
Consider the following production line; it consists of two machines working in-line. Each 
machine has a controller, smart sensors and smart actuators. The sampling frequency of 
each machine is 1,440 Hz.. The machine will fail if the information delay from sensor to 
controller to actuator exceeds 694 µsec. Also, if one of the two machines fails, the entire 
production line fails. 
In (Daoud et al., 2004b), fault-tolerance was introduced on a system consisting of two such 
machines. Both machines were linked through Gigabit Ethernet. The Gigabit Ethernet 
network connected all sensors, actuators and both controllers. It was shown that the failure 
of one controller on either of the two machines could be tolerated. Special software detected 
the failure of the controller and transferred its tasks to the remaining functional controller. 
Non-real-time traffic of FTP, HTTP, telnet and e-mail was not permitted. Mathematical tools 
are needed to justify this extra cost and prove that production line reliability will increase. 
One such tool is Markov chains. This will be explained next. 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 Markov Model and Mean Time To Failure 
Continuous-time Markov models have been widely used to predict the reliability and/or 
availability of fault-tolerant systems (Billinton & Allan, 1983; Blanke et al., 2006; Johnson, 
1989, Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998; Trivedi, 2002). The Markov model describing the system 
being studied, is shown in Fig. 5. This same model is also found in (Arnold, 1973; Trivedi, 
2002). State START is the starting state and represents the error-free situation. If one of the 
two controllers fails, the system moves from state START to state ONE-FAIL. In this state, 
both machines are still operating but only one controller is communicating with all sensors 
and actuators on both machines. If this controller fails before the first one is repaired, the 
system moves from state ONE-FAIL to state LINE-FAIL. This state is the failure state. The 
transition rates for the Markov chain in Fig. 5 are explained next. 
 Fig. 5. Markov model 
 
The system will move from state START to state ONE-FAIL when one of the two controllers 
fails, assuming that the controller failure is detected and that the recovery software 
successfully transfers control of both machines to the remaining operational controller. 
Otherwise, the system moves directly from  state  START  to state LINE-FAIL. This  explains  
the  transition  from state START to state LINE-FAIL. Let c be the probability of successful 
detection and recovery. In the literature, the parameter c is known as the coverage and has to 
be taken into account in the Markov model. One of the earliest papers that defined the 
coverage is (Arnold, 1973). It defined the coverage as the proportion of faults from which a 
system automatically recovers. In (Trivedi, 2002), it was shown that a small change in the 
value of the coverage parameter had a big effect on system Mean Time To Failure (MTTF). 
The importance of the coverage was further emphasized in (Amer & McCluskey, 1986, 
1987a, 1987b, 1987c). Here, the controller software is responsible for detecting a controller 
failure and switching the control of that machine to the operational controller on the other 
machine. Consequently, the value of the coverage depends on the quality of the switching 
software on each controller. 
Assuming, for simplicity, that both controllers have the same failure rate λ, the transition 
rate from state START to state ONE-FAIL will be equal to A=2cλ. 
As mentioned above, the system will move from state START to state ONE-FAIL if a 
controller failure is not detected or if the recovery software does not transfer control to the 
operational controller. A software problem in one of the controllers, for example, can cause 
sensor data to be incorrectly processed and the packet sent to the actuator will have 
incorrect data but correct CRC. The actuator verifies the CRC, processes the data and the 
system fails. Another potential problem that cannot be remedied by the fault-tolerant 
architecture described here is as follows: Both controllers are operational but their inter-
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communication fails. Each controller assumes that the other has failed and takes control of 
the entire production line. This conflict causes a production line failure. Consequently, the 
transition  rate from  state START to state LINE-FAIL will be equal to B=(1-c)2λ. 
If the failed controller is repaired while the system is in state ONE-FAIL, a transition occurs 
to state START. Let the rate of this transition be D=µ. While in state ONE-FAIL, the failure of 
the remaining controller (before the first one is repaired) will take the system to state LINE-
FAIL. Hence, the transition rate from state ONE-FAIL to state LINE-FAIL is equal to E=λ. 
The Markov model in Fig. 5 can be used to calculate the reliability R(t) of the 1-out-of-2 
system under study.  
 
)()()( tPtPtR FAILONESTART       (4) 
 
where PSTART(t) is the probability of being in state START at time t and PONE-FAIL(t) is the 
probability of being in state ONE-FAIL at time t. The model can also be used to obtain the 
Mean Time To Failure (MTTFft) of the system. MTTFft can be calculated as follows (Billinton, 
1983): First, the Stochastic Transitional Probability Matrix P for the model in Fig. 5 is 
obtained: 
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where element pij is the transition rate from state i to state j. So, for example, p01 is equal to 
A=2cλ as in Fig. 5. But state LINE-FAIL is an absorbing state. Consequently, the truncated 
matrix Q is obtained from P by removing the rightmost column and the bottom row. So, 
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Let matrix M = [I-Q]-1 
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where L = {(A+B)(D+E)}- AD. M is generally defined as the fundamental matrix in which 
element mij is the average time spent in state j given that the system starts in state i before 
being absorbed. Since the system under study starts in state START and is absorbed in state 
LINE-FAIL, 
 
MTTFft = m00 +m01         (8) 
 
For the system under study in this research, 
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Expanding again in terms of λ, µ and c: 
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6.2 Improving MTTF – First Approach 
This section shows how to use the Markov model to improve system MTTF in a cost-
effective manner. Let the 2-machine fault-tolerant production line described above, have the 
following parameters: 
 
λ1: controller failure rate 
μ1: controller repair rate 
c1: coverage 
 
Increasing MTTF can be achieved by decreasing λ1, increasing μ1, increasing c1 or a 
combination of the above. A possible answer to this question can be obtained by using 
operations research techniques in order to obtain a triplet (λoptimal, coptimal, μoptimal) that will 
lead to the highest MTTF. Practically, however, it may not be possible to find a controller 
with the exact failure rate λoptimal and/or the coverage coptimal. Also, it may be difficult to find 
a maintenance plan with µoptimal. Upon contacting the machine’s manufacturer, the factory 
will be offered a few choices in terms of better software versions and/or better maintenance 
plans. Better software will improve λ and c; the maintenance plan will affect µ.  As 
mentioned above, let the initial value of λ, μ and c be {λ1, c1, μ1}. Better software will change 
these values to {λj, cj, μ1} for 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Here, n is the number of more sophisticated software 
versions. Practically, n will be a small number. Changing the maintenance policy will 
change μ1 to μk for 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Again, m will be a small number. In summary, system 
parameters {λ1, c1, μ1} can only be changed to a small number of alternate triplets {λj, cj, μk}. If  
n=3 and m=2, for example, the number of scenarios that need to be studied is (mn-1)=5. 
Running the Markov model 5 times will produce 5 possible values for the improved MTTF. 
Each scenario will obviously have a cost associated with it. Let 
 
cost
MTTFMTTF oldimproved   
 
MTTFold is obtained by plugging (λ1, c1, µ1) in the Markov model while MTTFimproved is 
obtained using one of the other 5 triplets. η represents the improvement in system MTTF 
with respect to cost. The triplet that produces the highest η is chosen. 
 
6.3 Improving MTTF – Second Approach 
In this more complex approach, it is shown that λ, µ and c are not totally independent of 
each other. Let Qsoftware be the quality of the software installed on the controller and let 
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communication fails. Each controller assumes that the other has failed and takes control of 
the entire production line. This conflict causes a production line failure. Consequently, the 
transition  rate from  state START to state LINE-FAIL will be equal to B=(1-c)2λ. 
If the failed controller is repaired while the system is in state ONE-FAIL, a transition occurs 
to state START. Let the rate of this transition be D=µ. While in state ONE-FAIL, the failure of 
the remaining controller (before the first one is repaired) will take the system to state LINE-
FAIL. Hence, the transition rate from state ONE-FAIL to state LINE-FAIL is equal to E=λ. 
The Markov model in Fig. 5 can be used to calculate the reliability R(t) of the 1-out-of-2 
system under study.  
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where PSTART(t) is the probability of being in state START at time t and PONE-FAIL(t) is the 
probability of being in state ONE-FAIL at time t. The model can also be used to obtain the 
Mean Time To Failure (MTTFft) of the system. MTTFft can be calculated as follows (Billinton, 
1983): First, the Stochastic Transitional Probability Matrix P for the model in Fig. 5 is 
obtained: 
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where element pij is the transition rate from state i to state j. So, for example, p01 is equal to 
A=2cλ as in Fig. 5. But state LINE-FAIL is an absorbing state. Consequently, the truncated 
matrix Q is obtained from P by removing the rightmost column and the bottom row. So, 
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where L = {(A+B)(D+E)}- AD. M is generally defined as the fundamental matrix in which 
element mij is the average time spent in state j given that the system starts in state i before 
being absorbed. Since the system under study starts in state START and is absorbed in state 
LINE-FAIL, 
 
MTTFft = m00 +m01         (8) 
 
For the system under study in this research, 
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Expanding again in terms of λ, µ and c: 
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6.2 Improving MTTF – First Approach 
This section shows how to use the Markov model to improve system MTTF in a cost-
effective manner. Let the 2-machine fault-tolerant production line described above, have the 
following parameters: 
 
λ1: controller failure rate 
μ1: controller repair rate 
c1: coverage 
 
Increasing MTTF can be achieved by decreasing λ1, increasing μ1, increasing c1 or a 
combination of the above. A possible answer to this question can be obtained by using 
operations research techniques in order to obtain a triplet (λoptimal, coptimal, μoptimal) that will 
lead to the highest MTTF. Practically, however, it may not be possible to find a controller 
with the exact failure rate λoptimal and/or the coverage coptimal. Also, it may be difficult to find 
a maintenance plan with µoptimal. Upon contacting the machine’s manufacturer, the factory 
will be offered a few choices in terms of better software versions and/or better maintenance 
plans. Better software will improve λ and c; the maintenance plan will affect µ.  As 
mentioned above, let the initial value of λ, μ and c be {λ1, c1, μ1}. Better software will change 
these values to {λj, cj, μ1} for 2 ≤ j ≤ n. Here, n is the number of more sophisticated software 
versions. Practically, n will be a small number. Changing the maintenance policy will 
change μ1 to μk for 2 ≤ k ≤ m. Again, m will be a small number. In summary, system 
parameters {λ1, c1, μ1} can only be changed to a small number of alternate triplets {λj, cj, μk}. If  
n=3 and m=2, for example, the number of scenarios that need to be studied is (mn-1)=5. 
Running the Markov model 5 times will produce 5 possible values for the improved MTTF. 
Each scenario will obviously have a cost associated with it. Let 
 
cost
MTTFMTTF oldimproved   
 
MTTFold is obtained by plugging (λ1, c1, µ1) in the Markov model while MTTFimproved is 
obtained using one of the other 5 triplets. η represents the improvement in system MTTF 
with respect to cost. The triplet that produces the highest η is chosen. 
 
6.3 Improving MTTF – Second Approach 
In this more complex approach, it is shown that λ, µ and c are not totally independent of 
each other. Let Qsoftware be the quality of the software installed on the controller and let 
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Qoperator represent the operator’s expertise. A better version of the software (higher Qsoftware) 
will affect all three parameters simultaneously. Obviously, a better version of the software 
will have a lower software failure rate, thereby lowering λ. Furthermore, this better version 
is expected to have more sophisticated error detection and recovery mechanisms. This will 
increase the coverage c. Finally, the diagnostics capabilities of the software should be 
enhanced in this better version. This will reduce troubleshooting time, decrease the  Repair 
time and increase µ. 
Another important factor is the operator’s expertise Qoperator. The controller is usually an 
industrial PC (Daoud et al., 2003). The machine manufacturer may be able to supply the 
hardware and software failure rates but the operator’s expertise has to be factored in the 
calculation of the controller’s failure rate on site. The operator does not just use the 
controller to operate the machine but also uses it for HTTP, FTP, e-mail, etc, beneficiating of 
its capabilities as a PC. Operator errors (due to lack of experience) will increase the 
controller failure rate. An experienced operator will make less mistakes while operating the 
machines. Hence, λ will decrease. Furthermore, an experienced operator will require less 
time to repair a controller, i.e., µ will increase. 
In summary, an increase in Qsoftware produces a decrease in λ and an increase in c and µ. Also, 
an increase in Qoperator reduces λ and increases µ. Next, it is shown how to use Qsoftware and 
Qoperator to calculate λ, µ and c. The parameter λ can now be written as follows: 
 
operatorsoftwarehardware                     (11) 
 
The manufacturer determines λhardware. In general, let λsoftware = f(Qsoftware). The function f is 
determined by the manufacturer. Alternatively, the manufacturer could just have a  table 
indicating the software failure rate for each of the software versions. Similarly, let λoperator = 
g(Qoperator). The function g has to be determined on site. Regarding the repair rate and the 
coverage, remember that, for an exponentially-distributed repair time, μ will be the inverse 
of the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). There are two cases to be considered here. First, the 
factory does not stock controller spare parts on premises. Upon the occurrence of a 
controller failure, the agent of the machine manufacturer imports the appropriate spare part.  
A technician may also be needed to install this part. Several factors may therefore affect the 
MTTR including the availability of the spare part in the manufacturer’s warehouse, customs, 
etc. Customs may seriously affect the MTTR in the case of developing countries, for 
example; in this case the MTTR will be in the order of two weeks. In summary, if the factory 
does not stock spare parts on site, the MTTR will be dominated by travel time, customs, etc. 
The effects of Qsoftware and Qoperator can be neglected. 
Second, the factory does stock spare parts on site. If a local technician can handle the 
problem, the repair time should be just several hours. However, this does depend on the 
quality of the software and on the expertise of the technician. The better the diagnostic 
capabilities of the software, the quicker it will take to locate the faulty component. On the 
other hand, if the software cannot easily pinpoint the faulty component, the expertise of the 
technician will be essential to quickly fix the problem. If a foreign technician is needed, 
travel time has to be included in the repair time which will not be in the orders of several 
hours anymore. Let 
      localforeign techforeignPtechforeignP   1                 (12) 
μlocal is the expected repair rate in case the failure is repaired locally. µlocal is obviously a 
function of Qsoftware and Qoperator. Let µlocal = h(Qsoftware, Qoperator). The function h has to be 
determined on site. If a foreign technician is required, travel time and the technician’s 
availability have to be taken into account. Again, here, the travel time is expected to 
dominate the actual repair time on site; in other words, the effects of Qsoftware and Qoperator can 
be neglected. The probability of requiring a foreign technician to repair a failure can be 
calculated as a first approximation from the number of times a foreign technician was 
required in the near past. The coverage parameter c has to be determined by the machine 
manufacturer. 
Finally, to calculate the MTTF, the options are not numerous. The production manager will 
only have a few options to choose from. This approach is obviously more difficult to 
implement than the previous one. The determination of the functions f, g and h is not an 
easy task. On the other hand, using these functions permits the incorporation of the effect of 
software quality and operator expertise on λ, c and μ. The Markov model is used again to 
determine the MTTF for each triplet (λ, c, µ) and η determines the most cost-effective 
scenario. More details can be found in (Amer & Daoud 2006b). 
 
7. Modeling Repair and Calculating Average Speed 
 
The Markov chain in Fig. 5 has an absorbing state, namely state LINE-FAIL. In order to 
calculate system availability, the Markov chain should not have any absorbing states. 
System instantaneous availability is defined as the probability that the system is functioning 
properly at a certain time t. Conventional 1-out-of-2 Markov models usually model the 
repair as a transition from state ONE-FAIL to state START with a rate µ and another 
transition from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL with a rate of 2µ (assuming that there 
are two repair persons available) (Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). If there is only one repair 
person available (which is the realistic assumption in the context of developing countries), 
the transition rate from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL is equal to µ. Figure 6 is the 
same Markov model as in Fig. 5 except for the extra transition from state LINE-FAIL back to 
state START. This model has a better representation of the repair policies in developing 
countries. In this improved model, the transition from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL is 
cancelled. This is more realistic, although unconventional. Since most of the repair time is 
really travel time (time to import spare parts or time for a specialist to travel to the site), the 
difference in the time to repair one controller or two controllers will be minimal. In this 
model, the unavailability is equal to the probability of being in state LINE-FAIL while the 
availability is equal to the sum of the probabilities of being in states START and ONE-FAIL. 
These probabilities are going to be used next to calculate the average operating speed of the 
production line. 
In (Daoud et al., 2005), it was found that a fully operational fault-tolerant production line 
with two machines can operate at a speed of 1.4S where S is the normal speed (1 revolution 
per minute as mentioned above). If one controller fails, the other controller takes charge of 
its duties and communicates with all sensors and actuators on both machines. The 
maximum speed of operation in this case was 1.3S. Assuming λ is not affected by machine 
speed, the average steady state speed Speed_Avss will be equal to: 
 
)3.1()()4.1()(_ SPSPAvSpeed FAILssONESTARTssss                  (13) 
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Qoperator represent the operator’s expertise. A better version of the software (higher Qsoftware) 
will affect all three parameters simultaneously. Obviously, a better version of the software 
will have a lower software failure rate, thereby lowering λ. Furthermore, this better version 
is expected to have more sophisticated error detection and recovery mechanisms. This will 
increase the coverage c. Finally, the diagnostics capabilities of the software should be 
enhanced in this better version. This will reduce troubleshooting time, decrease the  Repair 
time and increase µ. 
Another important factor is the operator’s expertise Qoperator. The controller is usually an 
industrial PC (Daoud et al., 2003). The machine manufacturer may be able to supply the 
hardware and software failure rates but the operator’s expertise has to be factored in the 
calculation of the controller’s failure rate on site. The operator does not just use the 
controller to operate the machine but also uses it for HTTP, FTP, e-mail, etc, beneficiating of 
its capabilities as a PC. Operator errors (due to lack of experience) will increase the 
controller failure rate. An experienced operator will make less mistakes while operating the 
machines. Hence, λ will decrease. Furthermore, an experienced operator will require less 
time to repair a controller, i.e., µ will increase. 
In summary, an increase in Qsoftware produces a decrease in λ and an increase in c and µ. Also, 
an increase in Qoperator reduces λ and increases µ. Next, it is shown how to use Qsoftware and 
Qoperator to calculate λ, µ and c. The parameter λ can now be written as follows: 
 
operatorsoftwarehardware                     (11) 
 
The manufacturer determines λhardware. In general, let λsoftware = f(Qsoftware). The function f is 
determined by the manufacturer. Alternatively, the manufacturer could just have a  table 
indicating the software failure rate for each of the software versions. Similarly, let λoperator = 
g(Qoperator). The function g has to be determined on site. Regarding the repair rate and the 
coverage, remember that, for an exponentially-distributed repair time, μ will be the inverse 
of the Mean Time To Repair (MTTR). There are two cases to be considered here. First, the 
factory does not stock controller spare parts on premises. Upon the occurrence of a 
controller failure, the agent of the machine manufacturer imports the appropriate spare part.  
A technician may also be needed to install this part. Several factors may therefore affect the 
MTTR including the availability of the spare part in the manufacturer’s warehouse, customs, 
etc. Customs may seriously affect the MTTR in the case of developing countries, for 
example; in this case the MTTR will be in the order of two weeks. In summary, if the factory 
does not stock spare parts on site, the MTTR will be dominated by travel time, customs, etc. 
The effects of Qsoftware and Qoperator can be neglected. 
Second, the factory does stock spare parts on site. If a local technician can handle the 
problem, the repair time should be just several hours. However, this does depend on the 
quality of the software and on the expertise of the technician. The better the diagnostic 
capabilities of the software, the quicker it will take to locate the faulty component. On the 
other hand, if the software cannot easily pinpoint the faulty component, the expertise of the 
technician will be essential to quickly fix the problem. If a foreign technician is needed, 
travel time has to be included in the repair time which will not be in the orders of several 
hours anymore. Let 
      localforeign techforeignPtechforeignP   1                 (12) 
μlocal is the expected repair rate in case the failure is repaired locally. µlocal is obviously a 
function of Qsoftware and Qoperator. Let µlocal = h(Qsoftware, Qoperator). The function h has to be 
determined on site. If a foreign technician is required, travel time and the technician’s 
availability have to be taken into account. Again, here, the travel time is expected to 
dominate the actual repair time on site; in other words, the effects of Qsoftware and Qoperator can 
be neglected. The probability of requiring a foreign technician to repair a failure can be 
calculated as a first approximation from the number of times a foreign technician was 
required in the near past. The coverage parameter c has to be determined by the machine 
manufacturer. 
Finally, to calculate the MTTF, the options are not numerous. The production manager will 
only have a few options to choose from. This approach is obviously more difficult to 
implement than the previous one. The determination of the functions f, g and h is not an 
easy task. On the other hand, using these functions permits the incorporation of the effect of 
software quality and operator expertise on λ, c and μ. The Markov model is used again to 
determine the MTTF for each triplet (λ, c, µ) and η determines the most cost-effective 
scenario. More details can be found in (Amer & Daoud 2006b). 
 
7. Modeling Repair and Calculating Average Speed 
 
The Markov chain in Fig. 5 has an absorbing state, namely state LINE-FAIL. In order to 
calculate system availability, the Markov chain should not have any absorbing states. 
System instantaneous availability is defined as the probability that the system is functioning 
properly at a certain time t. Conventional 1-out-of-2 Markov models usually model the 
repair as a transition from state ONE-FAIL to state START with a rate µ and another 
transition from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL with a rate of 2µ (assuming that there 
are two repair persons available) (Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). If there is only one repair 
person available (which is the realistic assumption in the context of developing countries), 
the transition rate from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL is equal to µ. Figure 6 is the 
same Markov model as in Fig. 5 except for the extra transition from state LINE-FAIL back to 
state START. This model has a better representation of the repair policies in developing 
countries. In this improved model, the transition from state LINE-FAIL to state ONE-FAIL is 
cancelled. This is more realistic, although unconventional. Since most of the repair time is 
really travel time (time to import spare parts or time for a specialist to travel to the site), the 
difference in the time to repair one controller or two controllers will be minimal. In this 
model, the unavailability is equal to the probability of being in state LINE-FAIL while the 
availability is equal to the sum of the probabilities of being in states START and ONE-FAIL. 
These probabilities are going to be used next to calculate the average operating speed of the 
production line. 
In (Daoud et al., 2005), it was found that a fully operational fault-tolerant production line 
with two machines can operate at a speed of 1.4S where S is the normal speed (1 revolution 
per minute as mentioned above). If one controller fails, the other controller takes charge of 
its duties and communicates with all sensors and actuators on both machines. The 
maximum speed of operation in this case was 1.3S. Assuming λ is not affected by machine 
speed, the average steady state speed Speed_Avss will be equal to: 
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where PSTARTss and PONE-FAILss are the steady state probabilities of being in states START and 
ONE-FAIL respectively. If the machines had been operated at normal speed, 
        SPSPAvSpeed FAILssONESTARTssss _                  (14) 
 
 Fig. 6. Improved Markov model 
 
Equations 13 and 14 can be used to estimate the increase in production when the machines 
are operated at higher-than-normal speeds. It is important to note here that machines are not 
usually operated at their maximum speed on a regular basis but only from time to time in 
order to obtain a higher turn-over. More information regarding this topic can be found in 
(Amer et al., 2005). 
 
8. TMR Sensors 
 
In the production line studied above, the sensors, switches and actuators were single points 
of failure. Introducing redundancy at the controller level may not be enough if the failure 
rate of the sensors/switches/actuators is relatively high especially since there are 32 sensors, 
8 actuators, 3 switches and just two controllers. Introducing fault tolerance at the sensor 
level will certainly increase reliability. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)  is a well-known 
fault tolerance technique (Johnson, 1989; Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). Each sensor is 
triplicated. The three identical sensors send the same data to the controller. The controller 
compares the data; if the three messages are within the permissible tolerance range, the 
message is processed. If one of the three messages is different than the other two, it is 
concluded that the sensor responsible for sending this message has failed and its data is 
discarded. One of the other two identical messages is processed. This is known as masking 
redundancy (Johnson, 1989; Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). The system does not fail even though 
one of its components is no longer operational. Triplicating each sensor in a light-traffic 
machine means that the machine will have 48 (=16*3) sensors, one controller and 4 actuators. 
The first important consequence of this extra hardware is the increased traffic on the 
network. The number of packets produced by sensors will be tripled. A machine with 48 
sensors, one controller and 4 actuators was simulated and studied (Daoud et al. 2003); this is 
the heavy-traffic machine.  The OPNET simulations in (Daoud et al., 2003) indicated that 
Gigabit Ethernet was able to accommodate both control and communication loads. Another 
important issue regarding the  triplication of the sensors is cost-effectiveness. From a 
reliability point of view, triplicating sensors is expected to increase the system Mean Time 
Between Failures (MTBF) and consequently, decrease the down time. However, the cost of 
adding fault tolerance has to be taken into account. This cost includes the extra sensors, the 
wiring, bigger switches and software modifications. The software is now  required to handle 
the “voting” process; the messages from each three identical sensors have to be compared. If 
the three messages are within permissible tolerance ranges, one message is processed. If one 
of the messages is different from the other two, one of the two valid messages is used. The 
sensor that sent the corrupted message is disregarded till being repaired. If a second sensor 
from this group fails, the software will not be able to detect which of the sensors has failed 
and the production line has to be stopped. It is the software’s responsibility to alert the 
operator using Human Machine Interface (HMI) about the location of the first 
malfunctioning sensor and to stop the production line upon the failure of the second sensor. 
System reliability is investigated next in order to find out whether or not the extra cost is 
justified. 
 
 Fig. 7. RBD for Two-Cont Configuration 
 
Reliability Block Diagrams (RBDs) can be used to calculate system reliability (Siewiorek & 
Swarz, 1998). Three configurations will be studied and compared. In the first configuration, 
there is no fault tolerance. Any sensor, controller, switch or actuator on either machine is a 
single point of failure. For exponentially-distributed failure times, the system failure rate is 
the sum of the failure rates of all its components. Let this configuration be the Simplex 
configuration. If fault tolerance is introduced at the controller level only (as in (Daoud et al., 
2004b)), this configuration will be called Two-Cont. Figure 7 shows the RBD of the Two-Cont 
production line with two light-traffic machines. It is clear that fault tolerance only exists at 
the controller level. Figure 8 describes the RBD of the same production line but with two 
heavy-traffic machines. Now, every sensor is a TMR system and will fail when two of its 
sensors fail (2/3 system). Let this configuration be called the TMR configuration. Only the 
actuators and the switches constitute single points of failure. Instead of calculating system 
reliability, another  approach is taken here, namely the Mission Time (MT). MT(rmin) is the 
time at which system reliability falls below rmin (Johnson, 1989; Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998). 
rmin is determined by production management and represents the minimum acceptable 
reliability for the production line. The production line will run continuously for a period of 
MT. Maintenance will then be performed; if one of the controllers has failed, it is repaired as 
well as any failed sensor. rmin is chosen such that the probability of having a system failure 
during MT is minimal. 
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reliability, another  approach is taken here, namely the Mission Time (MT). MT(rmin) is the 
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It is assumed here that the production line is totally fault-free after maintenance. If rmin is 
high enough, there will be no unscheduled down time and no loss of production. Of course, 
if rmin is very high, MT will decrease and the down time will increase. Production can of 
course be directly related to cost. Let Rline be the reliability of the production line. Rsensor, 
Rswitch, Rcontroller and Ractuator will be the reliabilities of the sensor, switch, controller and 
actuator, respectively. For exponentially-distributed failure times:  R = e-t. R is the 
component reliability (sensor, controller, ...) and λ is its failure rate (which is constant 
(Johnson, 1989; Siewiorek & Swarz, 1998)). Assume for simplicity that the switches are very 
reliable when compared to the sensors, actuators or controllers and that their probability of 
failure can be neglected. Furthermore, assume that all sensors on both machines have an 
identical reliability. The same applies for the controllers and the actuators. Next, the 
reliabilities of the production line will be calculated for the three configurations: Simplex,  
Two-Cont and TMR. 
In the Simplex mode, there is no fault tolerance at all and any sensor, controller or actuator 
failure causes a system failure. Hence: 
 
))()(( 8232 actuatorcontrollersensorline RRRR                    (15) 
 
Remember that each machine has 16 sensors, one controller and 4 actuators and the system 
(production line) consists of two machines. If fault tolerance is introduced at the controller 
level (as in (Daoud et al., 2004b) 
       8232 11 actuatorcontrollersensorline RRRR                   (16) 
 
The next level of fault tolerance is the introduction of Triple Modular Redundancy at the 
sensor level. Each of the 32 sensors will now be a sensor assembly that consists of three 
identical sensors. Hence 
       823232 1123 actuatorcontrollersensorsensorline RRRRR                  (17) 
 
Equations 15, 16 and 17 are then used to determine MT for a specific value of Rline for each of 
the three configurations. Hence, the cost-effectiveness of the added fault-tolerance can be 
quantitatively examined. More details can be found in (Amer & Daoud, 2008). 
 
 
 
9. Conclusion 
  
This chapter has discussed the performance and reliability of fault-tolerant Ethernet 
Networked Control Systems. The use of Gigabit Ethernet in networked control systems was 
investigated using the OPNET simulator.  Real-time traffic and non-real time traffic were 
integrated without changing the IEEE 802.3 protocol packet format.  In a mixed traffic 
industrial environment, it was found that standard Gigabit Ethernet switches succeeded in 
meeting the required time constraints. The maximum speed of operation of individual 
machines and fault tolerant production-lines was also studied. 
The reliability and availability of fault tolerant production lines was addressed next. It was 
shown how to use  Markov models to find the most cost-effective way of increasing the 
Mean Time To Failure MTTF. Improved techniques for modeling repair were also discussed. 
Finally, it was shown how to introduce fault tolerance at the sensor level in order to increase 
production line mission time. 
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